SECURITY & VALIDATION

How we approach security.

We test access boundaries, investigate failures and publish the limits of our evidence. Trust requires checks that can be repeated.

Development previewInternal review snapshot · 23 October 2026

IMPLEMENTED CONTROLS

Protection at several boundaries.

Accounts & access

Scrypt password hashes, HttpOnly session cookies and Secure cookies for configured HTTPS deployments. Owner, reviewer and viewer roles separate supported actions. Production registration requires a mailbox code before creating a workspace.

Tenant & project scope

PostgreSQL row-level policies and project grants are designed to constrain access. Review environments restrict review decisions; project readers can see retained metadata across that project’s environments.

Credentials & connectors

Authenticated encryption binds stored connector credentials to their context. Approved targets, pinned addresses and verified TLS checks bound remote connector access.

Browser & request controls

Origin checks, a restrictive Content Security Policy, framing restrictions, request bounds and HTTPS transport policy. Protected workspace operations recheck browser sessions after acquiring their transaction lock. Startup readiness checks required authentication-policy lock permissions.

WHAT THE EVIDENCE SHOWS

Testing has a defined scope.

Review snapshot, not continuous assurance
Area	Evidence	Boundary
Internal regression checks	Passing local automated tests	Identity, authorization, injection resistance, credential handling and recovery checks use unit tests, simulated APIs and renderer/controller fixtures.
Physical backup & PITR	Operator-reported real Docker passes	The tested local clone and before/after transaction target. This does not establish a production recovery objective.
Local S3 protocol	Operator-reported emulator pass	Synthetic encrypted artifacts, multipart transfer and pinned read-back. This does not validate AWS IAM, Object Lock enforcement or cloud durability.
Independent penetration test	Not performed	An external assessment of a deployed environment remains outstanding.
Production acceptance	Pending	Real multi-tenant database/concurrency, browser/TLS/provider flows, dependency advisories, capacity and separate-machine/AWS recovery remain open.

BEFORE PUBLIC PRODUCTION USE

Work we still need to validate.

Real restricted-role PostgreSQL tenant isolation, concurrent access changes and restored identity/session handling.
Authenticated browser flows, mail delivery, deployed TLS/proxy behavior and abuse limits. Transactional caps cover projects and retained dbt artifacts; other evidence, total disk usage and retention need further controls.
A current dependency advisory audit and independent assessment of the deployed product. Scheduled Airflow collection also requires real concurrent-worker and restricted-role database acceptance; local regression tests cover stale leases, access changes, credential revision checks and pipeline alert triage. The failure inbox retains original/latest evidence and records owner triage notes; opt-in emails use encrypted pending payloads, stable relay identities, bounded attempts and recipient access rechecks. Ordered relay outcome reports are validated and retained in immutable tenant-scoped history; known outcomes stop pending retries. Reports do not prove inbox placement or reading. Owner-only metadata exports use a repeatable database snapshot, recheck access before release and retain immutable checksum receipts. Exporting does not delete evidence or constitute a backup. Accepted bounce/complaint reports suppress further alert emails to that recipient across the workspace. Bounce resumption requires the verified recipient owner’s recorded review; complaint protection remains active. Investigation writes recheck current role, session, project access and assignment. Only the assigned verified reviewer may acknowledge/comment; owners manage assignment and closure. Closure records triage and does not authorize recovery. Overdue escalation requires pinned policy/deadline checks and separate email consent from the same verified recipient owner. Pending delivery is cancelled when relevant context changes; in-flight requests may already have reached the relay. Real provider delivery acceptance remains pending.
Separate-machine recovery and real AWS acceptance. AWS recovery has not been verified.
Production signup requires an emailed one-time code before workspace creation, with generic pre-code responses. The unverified local development bypass still distinguishes duplicate addresses. Real mail acceptance remains open.

Live SSO sign-in, MFA, paid billing and workflow execution are not delivered in this preview. An accepted recovery review does not authorize execution.

PRIVATE VULNERABILITY REPORTING

Found a security issue?

Email the maintainer with the affected version, minimal reproduction steps and likely impact. Use test accounts and sanitized evidence. Do not include passwords, recovery keys or customer data, and do not post sensitive details in public issues.

[email protected]

Test only systems you own or have explicit permission to assess. This contact is maintainer-provided; no response-time commitment or bug bounty is offered here.